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Employing the fundamental laws of quantum physics, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) promises
the unconditionally secure distribution of cryptographic keys. However, in practical realisations, a
QKD protocol is only secure, when the quantum bit error rate introduced by an eavesdropper
unavoidably exceeds the system error rate. This condition guarantees that an eavesdropper can-
not disguise his presence by simply replacing the original transmission line with a less faulty one.
Unfortunately, this condition also limits the possible distance between the communicating parties,
Alice and Bob, to a few hundred kilometers. To overcome this problem, we design a QKD pro-
tocol which allows Alice and Bob to distinguish system errors from eavesdropping errors. If they
are able to identify the origin of their errors, they can detect eavesdropping even when the system
error rate exceeds the eavesdropping error rate. To achieve this, the proposed protocol employs an
alternative encoding of information in two-dimensional photon states. Errors manifest themselves
as quantum bit and as index transmission errors with a distinct correlation between them in case
of intercept-resend eavesdropping. As a result, Alice and Bob can tolerate lower eavesdropping and
higher system error rates without compromising their privacy.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Based upon the fundamental laws of quantum mechan-
ics, quantum cryptography provides a technique for shar-
ing secret cryptographic keys with unconditional security
[1]. The underlying idea of quantum cryptography – also
known as quantum key distribution (QKD) – is that the
secret bits of the cryptographic key are encoded in the
quantum states of photons. When the encoded photons
are transmitted from one party to another, let us call
them Alice and Bob, an eavesdropper, Evan, cannot view
the key without introducing a significant error rate. Mea-
suring the bit transmission error rate by comparing some
randomly selected test bits hence allows Alice and Bob
to verify the security of their key transmission. Since
the first protocol for quantum cryptography, BB84 [2],
many variations of it have been proposed. These aim at
increasing the eavesdropping error rate, flexibility, and
efficiency of QKD. For example, Bennett [3] suggested in
1992 to use two non-orthogonal two-dimensional photon
states to distribute keys, thereby increasing the flexibility
in the choice of states. Later on, work in [4] and [5] intro-
duced respectively a three-state scheme and a six-state
protocol which create more difficulties for Evan.
The main difference between the protocol by Beige et
al. [6] and earlier protocols lies in the encoding of infor-
mation into quantum states. Instead of encoding a whole
alphabet into each basis, Ref. [6] proposes a scheme where
all the vectors of the same basis encode the same letter.
When optimising this strategy, a direct quantum com-
munication protocol between Alice and Bob is obtained
[7]. This protocol is a QKD protocol with maximum effi-
ciency but a relatively low error rate in case of eavesdrop-
ping. Recently, Khan et al. [8] used the same encoding to
maximise intercept-resend eavesdropping error rates. In
the following we refer to this protocol as KMB09. When
using two-dimensional photon states, KMB09 is essen-
tially the same as the SARG04 protocol by Scarani et
al. [9] with χ = 1/
√
2 [13]. Brierley [10] increased the
eavesdropping error rate of these protocols even further
by allowing Alice and Bob to use multiple bases of more
than two-dimensional photon states. This improvement
comes at the cost of very low key bit transmission effi-
ciencies.
In this paper, we design a QKD protocol with two-
dimensional photon states which is characterised not only
by one but two different types of errors with a distinct
correlation between both of them in case of eavesdrop-
ping. More concretely, we propose a QKD protocol,
where Alice and Bob can calculate a Quantum Bit Error
Rate (QBER). In addition, they can exchange informa-
tion about the index of the transmitted state. Unex-
pected differences in the index are measured by the In-
dex Transmission Error Rate (ITER). This combination
of measures makes it much harder for Evan to escape
his detection. The eavesdropper not only has to min-
imise different types of errors. Distinct correlations be-
tween the ITER and the QBER, ie. a distinct signature of
eavesdropping, allows Alice and Bob to detect the origin
of their errors. As a result, Alice and Bob can tolerate
lower eavesdropping and higher system error rates with-
out compromising their privacy. We no longer require
that the error rates in case of eavesdropping unavoidably
exceed the system error rate, since Evan can no longer
disguise his presence as system errors. This should allow
Alice and Bob to communicate securely over much longer
distances.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section II analyses the KMB09 protocol [8] and derives
the error rates and key bit transmission efficiencies of
this protocol for the case, where Alice and Bob use two-
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2dimensional photon states. Although this has not been
emphasized in our earlier work, the KMB09 protocol is
a QKD protocol with a QBER and an ITER. However,
as we shall see below, there is no distinct correlation be-
tween these errors in case of eavesdropping. Section III
therefore presents a variation of the KMB09 protocol
which permits Alice and Bob to use not only two but
three different bases. The third basis increases the flex-
ibility of the proposed protocol which can be used to
create a linear dependence between the ITER and the
QBER in the case of intercept-resend eavesdropping. Our
calculations are illustrated by figures which take all pos-
sible measurement bases of Evan into account and show
typical values for actual realisations of the proposed pro-
tocol. We finally summarise our findings in Section IV.
II. THE KMB09 PROTOCOL
Our first step in designing a QKD protocol with the
above described features is to notice that the encoding
of information used in the KMB09 protocol already re-
sults in two different types of errors: a QBER and an
ITER. In our earlier work [8], we did not recognise the
potential advantage of this fact and considered only the
ITER when designing optimal QKD protocols based on
more-than-two dimensional photon states. In this section
we analyse the KMB09 protocol with two-dimensional
photon states in much more detail than previously done
and present analytical results for the QBER, the ITER,
and the key bit transmission efficiencies with and without
eavesdropping and introduce the notation used through-
out this paper. As we shall see below, in the KMB09
protocol, there are only very weak correlations between
the QBER and the ITER. The second step in designing a
QKD protocol with an improved eavesdropping detection
is therefore the introduction of a variation of the original
KMB09 protocol in Section III.
A. The basic protocol
In the case of two-dimensional photon states, the
KMB09 protocol suggests that Alice and Bob use two
bases e and f of the form
e ≡ {|ei〉 : i = 1, 2} ,
f ≡ {|fi〉 : i = 1, 2} . (1)
Alice randomly prepares photons in the basis states of
e and f and sends them afterwards to Bob. For each
incoming photon, Bob randomly selects a basis and mea-
sures its state either in e or in f. After the transmission
of many photons, Alice publicly announces the index i
of each prepared state. Bob compares these indices with
the indices of his measurement outcomes and interprets
his findings as suggested by Table I. For each measured
photon, he obtains either 0, 1, or ×. These results in-
dicate respectively whether a 0, a 1 or no bit has been
Bob measures
Basis used Same index Different index
by Alice e f e f
e meaning 0 × × error 0
f meaning 1 × × 1 error
TABLE I: Bob’s interpretation of the measurements which
he performs on the incoming photons, after Alice announced
the index of the transmitted state. No key bit is obtained
when both have the same index, as indicated by the crosses.
An error occurs when both their states have a different index
although both use the same bases.
transmitted. Under ideal conditions, it is not possible
that Alice and Bob have different indices, when both use
the same basis. A key bit is hence obtained whenever
the index of the state sent by Alice is different from the
index measured by Bob. Notice that this encoding and
decoding works without having to apply any constraint
to the basis states of e and f . Bob obtains a 1, if he
measures an e state and he obtains a 0, if he measures f ,
whenever a key bit is transmitted, i.e. when Alice’s and
Bob’s indices are different.
Suppose the secure key distribution between Alice and
Bob is challenged by an eavesdropper Evan. As in
Ref. [8], we assume in the following that Evan applies
an intercept-resend strategy in order to obtain the in-
formation transmitted from Alice to Bob. This means,
Evan measures the state of each incoming photon in a
basis g,
g ≡ {|gk〉 : k = 1, 2} (2)
which is optimal for his purpose of minimising the error
rate introduced into the key bit transmission. Later on
Evan forwards the photon, in the state he found it in, to
Bob.
B. Parametrisation of states
Restricting ourselves to two-dimensional photon states
allows us to represent the basis states of e, f , and g with
the help of a Bloch sphere [12]. The Bloch sphere rep-
resentation allows to visualise two-dimensional complex
vectors by writing them as three-dimensional real vectors.
This is possible after neglecting an overall phase factor
with no physical consequences. Taking this into account,
any quantum mechanical state vector can be expressed as
a function of two angles θ and φ which serve as the spatial
coordinates for the corresponding three-dimensional real
vectors of unit length. In the following we use this ap-
proach to obtain a relatively simple parametrisation for
all the possible basis states which can be used by Alice,
Bob, and Evan.
Without restrictions we assume in the following that
the basis states of e are the canonical basis vectors.
Choosing an appropriate coordinate system, the vectors
3of the f basis can then be written such that they relate
to the states of e via a simple rotation by an angle θ1. In
this coordinate system, the generation of the basis states
of g requires in general two rotations of the e basis: one
rotation by an angle θ3 and another rotation by an angle
φ3. More concretely, we assume in the following that
|e1〉 =
(
1
0
)
, |e2〉 =
(
0
1
)
,
|f1〉 =
(
cos
(
1
2θ1
)
sin
(
1
2θ1
) ) , |f2〉 = ( sin ( 12θ1)− cos ( 12θ1)
)
,
|g1〉 =
(
cos
(
1
2θ3
)
eiφ3 sin
(
1
2θ3
) ) , |g2〉 = ( sin ( 12θ3)−eiφ3 cos ( 12θ3)
)
,
(3)
where θ1, θ3, and φ3 are real numbers ranging from 0 to
2pi. These three parameters describe all possible sets of
bases e, f , and g. When looking for an optimal strat-
egy, Alice and Bob only need to consider all the possible
values of these three angles.
Since all the states of the bases e, f , and g are of unit
length and pairwise orthogonal, one can easily check that
2∑
j=1
|〈gk|ej〉|2 =
2∑
j=1
|〈gk|fj〉|2 = 1 . (4)
This means, for example, that
|〈g1|e2〉|2 = 1− |〈g1|e1〉|2 = 1− |〈g2|e2〉|2 (5)
which implies
|〈g1|e1〉|2 = |〈g2|e2〉|2 . (6)
An analog relation applies between the states of the g
and of the f basis.
C. Index transmission errors
Let us first examine the error in the transmission of
each state’s index. An index transmission error occurs
when a photon prepared in |ei〉 (or |fi〉) is measured at
Bob’s end as |ej〉 (or |fj〉 respectively) with i 6= j. As-
suming that Alice randomly prepares all the states of e
and f with the same frequency and that Bob measures
e and f with the same frequency, we find that the Index
Transmission Error Rate (ITER) of the KMB09 protocol
equals [8]
PITER = 1− 1
4
2∑
i=1
2∑
k=1
[
|〈gk|ei〉|4 + |〈gk|fi〉|4
]
. (7)
Using Eqs. (4) and (6), this expression simplifies to
PITER = |〈g1|e1〉|2 + |〈g1|f1〉|2 − |〈g1|e1〉|4
−|〈g1|f1〉|4 . (8)
This expression can be calculated relatively easily for all
possible bases e, f , and g, i.e. for all possible values of
θ1, θ3, and φ3.
D. Quantum bit errors
In addition to calculating the transmission error rate
in terms of the index, Alice and Bob can calculate the
transmission error rate in terms of the quantum bit. The
Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) is calculated by select-
ing a certain number of control bits from the obtained key
sequence and comparing them openly. For the KMB09
protocol with two-dimensional photon states, the proba-
bility PQBER for getting a wrong bit equals [8]
PQBER =
4−∑2i=1∑2k=1 [ |〈ei|gk〉|4 + |〈fi|gk〉|4 ]
8−∑2i=1∑2k=1 [ |〈ei|gk〉|2 + |〈fi|gk〉|2 ]2 .
(9)
Using again Eqs. (4) and (6), the above equation simpli-
fies to
PQBER =
|〈e1|g1〉|2 + |〈f1|g1〉|2 − |〈e1|g1〉|4 − |〈f1|g1〉|4
2(|〈e1|g1〉|2 + |〈f1|g1〉|2)− (|〈e1|g1〉|2 + |〈f1|g1〉|2)2 .
(10)
Using the concrete vectors in Eq. (3) we can now calculate
the QBER for all possible scenarios.
E. Efficiency with and without eavesdropping
In the KMB09 protocol, Alice and Bob successfully
obtain a key bit when both use different bases and when
the index of the state measured by Bob is different from
the index of Alice’s state. The rate of transmitted key
bits per transmitted photon hence equals [8]
η =
1
2
· 1
4
2∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
[
|〈ei|fj〉|2 + |〈fi|ej〉|2
]
(11)
in the absence of any eavesdropping. This equation takes
into account that Alice chooses randomly between 4 dif-
ferent states and that there is a probability of 12 for Bob
to select one of the two bases e and f . Under ideal condi-
tions, no key bit is obtained whenever Alice and Bob use
the same bases. Renaming some of the indices and using
again the relations in Eqs. (4) and (6), Eq. (11) simplifies
to
η =
1
2
− 1
2
|〈e1|f1〉|2 . (12)
For the concrete basis vectors in Eq. (3), we hence find
η =
1
2
sin2
(
1
2
θ1
)
. (13)
For completeness, we also calculate the bit transmission
rate ηEvan in the case of an intercept-resend eavesdrop-
ping attack. This efficiency equals the probability that
4the index j of Bob’s state is different from the index i of
the state send by Alice which is given by [8]
ηEvan =
1
8
2∑
i=1
2∑
k=1
∑
j 6=i
[
|〈ei|gk〉|2.|〈gk|ej〉|2
+|〈fi|gk〉|2.|〈gk|fj〉|2 + |〈fi|gk〉|2.|〈gk|ej〉|2
+|〈ei|gk〉|2.|〈gk|fj〉|2
]
. (14)
Using again Eqs. (4) and (6) one can show that this equa-
tion is equivalent to
ηEvan = 1− 1
8
2∑
i=1
2∑
k=1
[
|〈ei|gk〉|2 + |〈fi|gk〉|2
]2
. (15)
Renaming indices and using again Eqs. (4) and (6) finally
yields
ηEvan = |〈e1|g1〉|2 + |〈f1|g1〉|2
−1
2
[
|〈e1|g1〉|2 + |〈f1|g1〉|2
]2
. (16)
This bit transmission rate is in general much higher than
the efficiency η in Eq. (13).
F. Interplay between the ITER and the QBER
As mentioned in Section I, one feature of KMB09 is
that an eavesdropper introduces not only one but two
different types of errors into the key bit transmission.
The relationship between the QBER, the ITER and the
key bit transmission efficiency ηEvan can be used by Alice
and Bob to detect eavesdropping much more efficiently.
Evan only remains unnoticed, if these variables change,
as if their changes were caused by system errors and not
by eavesdropping. When there are very strong corre-
lations between error rates and efficiencies, finding an
eavesdropping strategy which fulfills this condition be-
comes a very hard, maybe even an impossible task for
Evan to complete.
We therefore now have a closer look at the relation
between error rates and key bit transmission efficiencies
for KMB09. In the following we consider three different
choices of Alice and Bob’s angle θ1 and assume that θ1
equals either 54◦, 71◦, or 90◦. Moreover, we consider all
possible choices of Evan’s measurement basis g by varying
both angles θ3 and φ3 in Eq. (3) between 0 and 2pi. For
each case, we calculate the QBER, the ITER, and the bit
transmission efficiencies η and ηEvan. As illustrated in
Fig. 1, the QBER in case of eavesdropping is in all three
cases relatively high. It equals 40 %, 33 %, and 25 %,
respectively. We also see that η is relatively high in all
three cases. It equals 12 %, 17 %, and 25 %, respectively.
Moreover we notice that Evan has only limited free-
dom to choose certain values for the QBER, the ITER,
and the key bit transmission efficiency ηEvan, as long as
the QBER is relatively close to its theoretical minimum.
For example, for θ1 = 54
◦, we observe that minimising
the QBER yields PITER = 0.4 and ηEvan = 0.5. Minimis-
ing the ITER is possible but not without increasing the
QBER further. However, for relatively large QBER’s,
Evan has in general quite a lot of flexibility to choose his
measurement basis g such that the ITER, the QBER,
and ηEvan assume certain values by carefully adjusting
θ3 and φ3. In other words, Evan is able to make eaves-
dropping errors look like system errors when it matters
most. To overcome this problem, we now have a look at
a variation of the KMB09 protocol.
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FIG. 1: The ITER, η and ηEvan as a function of the cor-
responding quantum bit error rate for (a) θ1 = 54
◦, (b)
θ1 = 71
◦, and (c) θ1 = 90◦ for all possible choices of Evan’s
measurement basis. This means, the above figures are the
result of a numerical simulation which varies both angles θ3
and φ3 between 0 and 2pi.
5III. A VARIATION OF THE KMB09
PROTOCOL
There are many possible generalisations of the above
described protocol (cf. eg. Refs. [8] and [10]). In the
following, we present a variation which replaces the two
bases e and f of Alice and Bob by three bases e, f , and
h. Again we restrict ourselves to two-dimensional photon
states. As we shall see below, the proposed variation of
KMB09 yields QKD protocols with strong correlations
between the ITER and the QBER. This means, errors
caused by intercept-resend eavesdropping have a distinct
signature.
A. Basic premise
In the following we denote the bases used by Alice and
Bob e, f , and h such that
e ≡ {|ei〉 : i = 1, 2} ,
f ≡ {|fi〉 : i = 1, 2} ,
h ≡ {|hi〉 : i = 1, 2} . (17)
Suppose these bases encode 0=‘00’, 1=‘01’, and 2=‘10’,
respectively. Proceeding as above and using a table simi-
lar to Table I, Bob can then no longer decode Alice’s key
bits even when both obtain states with a different index.
Suppose Alice sends a photon in |ei〉 and Bob measures
|hj〉 with i 6= j. Then Bob knows that the incoming pho-
ton has not been prepared in the h basis but he still does
not know whether Alice sends a 0 or a 1.
A solution to this problem which does not result in a
significant drop of the key bit transmission efficiency is
that Alice and Bob form three pairs by pairing each basis
with every other basis. In the following we denote these
sets by S1, S2, and S3 and define
S1 ≡ {e, f} , S2 ≡ {e, h} , S3 ≡ {f, h} . (18)
Suppose Alice sends a photon prepared in |ei〉 which is
measured by Bob in |hj〉 with i 6= j. Bob now randomly
chooses one set which includes his measurement basis and
announces it publicly. If he announces for example S2,
then Alice knows Bob’s measurement basis which allows
them to obtain a shared-secret key. If Bob announces S3,
then Alice does not know Bob’s measurement basis. In
this case, Alice and Bob cannot deduce a key bit although
both of their states have a different index.
S1 S2 S3
e 0 0 –
f 1 – 0
h – 1 1
TABLE II: Meaning of Alice’s basis in which she prepares the
photon depending on which set has been announced by Bob.
Bob’s bases
Alice’s S1 S2 S3
bases e f e h f h
e meaning 0 error 0 error 0 - -
f meaning 0 or 1 1 error - - error 0
h meaning 1 - - 1 error 1 error
TABLE III: Interpretation of Bob’s measurement outcomes
for the case, where the indices of Alice and Bob’s states are
different and where both their bases are included in the set
announced by Bob. Evan cannot guess which bit is transmit-
ted, since each set is equally likely to encode a 0 or a 1.
In order to avoid that Evan can guess key bits with a
probability that is higher than the probability for correct
random guessing, Alice and Bob should employ the anal-
ogy of their situation to the KMB09 protocol and restrict
themselves to a two letter alphabet. They should use a
different encoding of the transmitted key bit, depending
on which set of basis pairs has been announced by Bob.
One possible encoding is shown in Table II: here f en-
codes either a 0 or a 1, while e always encodes 0, and
h always encodes 1. Most importantly, each set of bases
Sk is equally likely to encode a 0 and to encode a 1. In
this way, the eavesdropper obtains no information when
Bob announces his chosen set. How this new encoding
affects Bob’s interpretation of his measurement outcomes
is explained in Table III.
Before stating the concrete protocol let us summarise
the three types of classical information which Alice and
Bob have to reveal with every successful photon trans-
mission:
a Firstly, Alice must announce the index of each
transmitted state after sending the photon to Bob.
b Secondly, Bob must announce a set Sk, whenever
Bob’s measurement index is different from Alice’s
index.
c Finally, Alice must announce whether Bob’s set Sk
contains her basis or not.
Bob chooses his set Sk by randomly choosing between
two bases pairs which contain his measurement basis. A
key bit is obtained, if the set chosen by Bob contains both
the basis which the photon has been prepared in and the
basis which the photon has been measured in.
B. The proposed protocol
We now assume that Alice and Bob already agreed on
a concrete set of bases B = {e, f, h} for the preparation
and the measurement of their photon states. Moreover,
we assume that they introduced the basis pairs S1, S2,
and S3 in Eq. (18) and that they agreed to use the inter-
pretation of information suggested in Tables II and III.
Then their QKD protocol works as follows:
61. Alice generates a random sequence of symbols x ∈
{e, f, h} and assigns a random index i ∈ {1, 2} to
every one of them.
2. Alice then uses this sequence and the correspond-
ing indices, prepares a sequence of photons in the
respective states |xi〉, and sends them to Bob.
3. Bob measures the state of every incoming photon,
thereby randomly switching his measurement basis
among the three bases in B.
4. Afterwards, Alice announces her random sequence
of indices i publicly.
5. Bob announces which photons he found in a state
|yj〉 with an index j which is different from the i
of the corresponding state |xi〉. For each of these
photons, he announces a set Sk which contains his
respective measurement basis.
6. Alice announces which ones of these sets contain
the basis in which she prepared the respective pho-
ton. Now Alice and Bob both know which photons
transmit one key bit and interpret the correspond-
ing photon states accordingly.
7. Finally, Alice and Bob openly compare some quan-
tum bits and some indices of transmitted states.
This allows them to calculate their QBER, their
ITER, and their key bit transmission efficiency. If
they detect an eavesdropper, the generated crypto-
graphic key is not secure.
C. Parametrisation of states
Eq. (3) describes a way to parametrize the basis states
of e, f , and g by three angles θ1, θ3, and φ3. Since
the QKD protocol discussed in this section requires an
additional basis h, we moreover define
|h1〉 =
(
cos
(
1
2θ2
)
eiφ2 sin
(
1
2θ2
) ) , |h2〉 = ( sin ( 12θ2)−eiφ2 cos ( 12θ2)
)
,
(19)
where θ2 and φ2 are real numbers ranging from 0 to 2pi.
D. Index transmission errors
An index transmission error occurs when a photon pre-
pared in a state with index i is measured at Bob’s end
in the same basis but found in a state with an index
j 6= i. To calculate the corresponding error rate we con-
sider only the cases, where Alice and Bob use the same
basis. Taking into account that the probability for choos-
ing one of the six states available to Alice equals 16 , we
find that the probability for an index transmission error
equals
PITER =
1
6
2∑
i=1
2∑
k=1
∑
j 6=i
[
|〈ei|gk〉|2|〈gk|ej〉|2 +
+|〈fi|gk〉|2|〈gk|fj〉|2 + |〈hi|gk〉|2|〈gk|hj〉|2
]
. (20)
This equation adds the probabilities of all events which
might result in the transmission of a wrong index, like the
case where Alice sends a photon in |e1〉, Evan measures
|g1〉, and Bob finally finds the photon forwarded to him
by Evan in |e2〉. Using Eq. (4) and the fact that the states
of all the bases are of unit length, Eq. (20) simplifies to
PITER = 1− 1
6
2∑
i=1
2∑
k=1
[
|〈gk|ei〉|4 + |〈gk|fi〉|4
+|〈gk|hi〉|4
]
. (21)
As expected, the ITER is one minus the probability that
no index transmission error occurs, when Alice and Bob
measure in the same bases. Simplifying the ITER further
using Eq. (6) and analog relations for the f and the h
basis, we find that
PITER =
2
3
[
|〈g1|e1〉|2 + |〈g1|f1〉|2 + |〈g1|h1〉|2
−|〈g1|e1〉|4 − |〈g1|f1〉|4 − |〈g1|h1〉|4
]
(22)
which is easier to evaluate than Eq. (21).
E. Quantum bit errors
The QBER is the ratio of the number of erroneous
bits to the total number of detected bits. This means,
to determine their QBER, Alice and Bob need to select
some of the transmitted bits as test bits and compare
their values publicly. A closer look at the above protocol
shows that the QBER is closely related to the ITER.
The reason is that a quantum bit error occurs whenever
Alice and Bob obtain a different index, although both
use the same basis (c.f. Table III). When both use the
same bases, it does not matter which set S1, S2, or S3
Bob chooses, since Alice’s basis is automatically included
in his set and a key bit is obtained. Taking this and the
fact that Alice and Bob both choose the same bases with
probability 13 into account, we find that
PQBER =
PITER
3PQB
, (23)
where PQB is the probability of Alice and Bob obtaining
a key bit for each transmitted photon.
To calculate PQB, we notice that whenever Alice and
Bob use a different basis, there is a probability of 12 that
Bob chooses a set S1, S2, or S3 which does not contain
7Alice’s basis. This means, even when Alice and Bob mea-
sure a different basis and obtain a different index, no key
bit is obtained in half of the cases. To calculate PQB we
now sum over all these cases and the cases where Alice
and Bob contain a wrong bit and find that
PQB =
1
3
PITER +
1
2
· 1
3
· 1
6
2∑
i=1
2∑
k=1
∑
j 6=i[
|〈ei|gk〉|2|〈gk|fj〉|2 + |〈ei|gk〉|2|〈gk|hj〉|2
+|〈fi|gk〉|2|〈gk|ej〉|2 + |〈fi|gk〉|2|〈gk|hj〉|2
+|〈hi|gk〉|2|〈gk|ej〉|2 + |〈hi|gk〉|2|〈gk|fj〉|2
]
. (24)
The factor 13 is the probability of Bob choosing one out
of the three possible bases e, f and h, while the factor 16
takes into account that Alice prepares her photons ran-
domly in one of six possible states.
Renaming indices in some of the terms, we see that
every term in Eq. (24) occurs twice. The quantum bit
transmission probability PQB hence simplifies to
PQB =
1
3
PITER +
1
18
2∑
i=1
2∑
k=1
∑
j 6=i
[
|〈ei|gk〉|2|〈gk|fj〉|2
+|〈ei|gk〉|2|〈gk|hj〉|2 + |〈hi|gk〉|2|〈gk|fj〉|2
]
. (25)
Using relations like the ones in Eqs. (4) and (6), one can
moreover show that this probability can also be written
as
PQB =
4
9
[
|〈g1|e1〉|2 + |〈g1|f1〉|2 + |〈g1|h1〉|2
]
−2
9
[
|〈g1|e1〉|4 + |〈g1|f1〉|4 + |〈g1|h1〉|4
+|〈g1|e1〉|2|〈g1|f1〉|2 + |〈g1|e1〉|2|〈g1|h1〉|2
+|〈g1|f1〉|2|〈g1|h1〉|2
]
(26)
which is easier to calculate than Eq. (25).
F. Efficiency with and without eavesdropping
As in KMB09, the efficiency of the key bit transmission
depends on whether Evan is present or not. For exam-
ple, the key bit transmission rate ηEvan is the probability
of Alice and Bob obtaining a key bit, when Evan listens
into the conversation between Alice and Bob. This im-
mediately implies
ηEvan = PQB (27)
with PQB as in Eq. (26). In order to calculate the key
transmission efficiency η in the absence of eavesdropping,
we have to take into account that Alice chooses randomly
between six states, that there is a probability of 12 for Bob
to announce a set which contains Alice’s basis, and that
there is a probability of 13 for Bob to select one of the
three basis e, f , or h. Moreover, we notice again that no
key bit is obtained whenever Alice and Bob use the same
bases. As a result, we find that
η =
1
2
· 1
3
· 1
6
2∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
[
|〈ei|fj〉|2 + |〈ei|hj〉|2
+|〈fi|ej〉|2 + |〈fi|hj〉|2 + |〈hi|ej〉|2 + |〈hi|fj〉|2
]
. (28)
Renaming again some of the indices and using again re-
lations like the ones in Eqs. (4) and (6), η simplifies to
η =
1
3
− 1
9
[
|〈e1|f1〉|2 + |〈e1|h1〉|2 + |〈f1|h1〉|2
]
. (29)
Using Eqs. (3) and (19), this efficiency η becomes
η =
1
6
− 1
18
[cos θ1 + cos θ2 + cos θ1 cos θ2
+ cosφ2 sin θ1 sin θ2] . (30)
Since this expression is not overly complicated, we add
it here for convenience.
G. Interplay between the ITER and the QBER
The main difference between the QKD protocol which
we discuss in this section and its original version is that
using three bases gives Alice and Bob more flexibility.
They can now choose their angles θ1, θ2, and φ2 such that
there are very strong correlations between the QBER
and the ITER in case of intercept-resent eavesdropping.
Fig. 2 illustrates the interplay between error rates and ef-
ficiencies for three different choices of the bases e, f , and
h. Like Fig. 1 before, this figure is the result of a numeri-
cal simulation which varies both angles θ3 and φ3 between
0 and 2pi. The main difference between Figs. 1 and 2 is
that there is now a strong dependence of the ITER on
the QBER. Figs. 2(b) and (c) even show a linear depen-
dence. This means, in these two cases, intercept-resend
eavesdropping has a distinct signature which makes it
much harder for an eavesdropper to hide his presence. If
the system errors of the transmission line do not have the
same signature, he cannot enter the scene unnoticed by
simply replacing the transmission line between Alice and
Bob with a less faulty one. In other words, eavesdropping
errors can no longer be mimicked by system errors.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a QKD protocol for which eaves-
dropping introduces not only one but two different types
of errors into the key bit transmission with a distinct cor-
relation between both of them. This is possible, since the
protocol uses an encoding of information which is differ-
ent from the encoding of information in BB84 [2]. Instead
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FIG. 2: The ITER, η and ηEvan as a function of the cor-
responding quantum bit error rate for (a) θ1 = 65
◦, θ2 =
65◦, φ2 = 280◦, (b) θ1 = 90◦, θ2 = 90◦, φ2 = 90◦, and (c)
θ1 = 110
◦, θ2 = 225◦, φ2 = 0◦ for all possible choices of Evan’s
measurement basis. Like Fig. 1, this figure is the result of a
numerical simulation which varies both angles θ3 and φ3 be-
tween 0 and 2pi.
of each basis encoding a whole alphabet, all the states
of the same basis encode the same letter. As a result,
eavesdropping introduces quantum bit as well as index
transmission errors. A quantum bit error occurs, when
Alice and Bob both obtain different key bits. An index
transmission error occurs when Alice and Bob use the
same basis but their respective states nevertheless have
different indices. Intercept-resend eavesdropping results,
in general, in a significant change of both the Quantum
Bit Error Rate (QBER) and the Index Transmission Er-
ror Rate (ITER).
The main purpose of the proposed QKD protocol is to
make it much harder for an eavesdropper to conceal his
presence. The eavesdropper now not only has to min-
imise different types of errors. The above mentioned
strong correlations between the ITER and the QBER
introduce a distinct signature of eavesdropping. This sig-
nature allows Alice and Bob to detect the origin of their
errors and to tolerate lower eavesdropping and higher sys-
tem error rates without compromising their privacy. We
no longer require that the error rates in case of eaves-
dropping unavoidably exceed the system error rate, since
Evan can no longer disguise his presence as system errors.
As a result, Alice and Bob should be able to communicate
securely over much longer distances.
Finally, let us remark that, for concrete practical
implementations of the proposed QKD scheme, Alice
and Bob should choose their bases e, f , and h such that
their system errors (and not the eavesdropping errors)
have a distinct signature. Changes of this signature
can then herald Evan’s presence, independent of his
eavesdropping strategy. Evan only remains unnoticed, if
the error rates and efficiencies which he introduces into
the key bit transmission are the same as the ones caused
by errors of the concrete experimental setup. Finding
an eavesdropping strategy which fulfils this condition is
in general a very hard task for Evan to complete. Our
analysis suggests that it might be impossible for Evan
to satisfy this condition.
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